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Summary
This thesis explores the consequences that climate change could have for the North-
East Arctic cod fishery shared by Norway and Russia. The focus is on the compet-
itive equilibrium. Today, the mature cod migrate to the Norwegian coast to spawn
each year. I will assume that higher ocean temperatures leads to new spawning
areas being established in Russian waters. This would mean that Russia gets in-
creased access to the mature age class. The effect this has on Norway is, as this
thesis will show, not entirely clear. The direct effect of reduced access to the mature
stock will make Norway worse off, but the Russian reaction to this change will likely
have the opposite effect.
The problem is explored by modeling the fishery as a game between Norway
and Russia where each agent decides how much to harvest of mature and immature
fish based on how much the other agent is harvesting. Using a version of the
model of Levhari and Mirman (1980) modfied to include two age classes rather
than just one, I derive both the first best allocation and the Nash equilibrium for
the competitive case. The first best solution is very similar to that found by Levhari
and Mirman, with the country specific coefficients intended to represent ownership
of the different age classes not affecting steady state recruitment. This is no longer
true in the competitive case, and these coefficients therefore determine the degree
of overfishing caused by competition.
It is found that under the assumptions of the model Russia shifting their harvest
towards mature fish and away from immature fish makes Norway better off. This
happens because such a shift leads to Russia catching less fish in total, leaving
Norway able to harvest more freely. It will be shown that the effect this has on the
efficiency of the fishery depends on Norway’s preferences. If Norway values harvest
of mature fish higher than harvest of immature fish, the efficiency of the fishery
will improve. If the opposite is true the efficiency will deteriorate, leading to lower
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steady state stock levels. In the former case, Norwegian harvest of both mature and
immature fish are rising in the Russian valuation of harvest of mature fish. This is
an effect of increased stock values. Russian harvest of immature fish is falling while
Russian harvest of mature fish is rising. Total harvest is falling because the mature
stock is smaller than the immature stock, which is a consequence of the dynamics
of the model.
After this, the thesis examines a situation where Russian valuation of harvest of
mature fish increases at the expense of the Norwegian equivalent. This represents
ownership of the mature age class shifting in Russias favour. The main result from
this discussion is that the most socially efficient outcome is reached when the age
classes are similarly distributed. This gives the best possible incentives as neither
agent faces a situation where a disproportionate share of the costs of their harvests
are born by the other. If the age classes are asymmetrically distributed, with one
agent owning a large share of the immature age class and another owning a large
share of the mature age class, both will be incentivized to overharvest as whatever
escapement they leave will mainly benefit the other agent. More generally, you
could say that if one age class is shared the other should be shared as well. This
represents a sharp contrast to the case without differentiation between age classes,
where competition is always bad. One important result found in this thesis is
therefore that a partially shared fish stock can be the worst scenario of all.
The thesis therefore gives two main arguments why the climate change may not
be as harmful for the Norwegian position as one might think. One is that Norway
benefits from Russia shifting their harvest towards mature fish and the other is that
a more even distribution of the mature age class leads to more efficient management
of the fish stock.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In economics competition is usually a good thing. Competitive markets generate
efficient equilibria where price equals marginal cost. This gives rise to the first
welfare theorem, which states that any competitive equilibrium is pareto efficient.
This, of course, rests on a number of assumptions. One of these is that all goods
are rival and excludable. This means that the good can only be consumed by one
person, and whoever owns the good is able to prevent others from consuming it.
There are, however, many goods for which this is not a very fitting description. A
fish stock is an example of one such good. Fish stocks are certainly rival. If I eat
a fish that means you are prevented from eating the same fish. They are, however,
often not excludable. It can be very difficult, often impossible, to prevent others
from harvesting a stock. This means that anyone harvesting will have an incentive
to harvest more than what is socially optimal, as anything they leave behind may
well be harvested by someone else. This causes the first welfare theorem to break
down and the competitive equilibrium is no longer pareto efficient.
In the real world there are often restrictions to who is allowed to harvest a fish
stock and to how much they are allowed to harvest. Quotas, taxes, gear restrictions
and so on all help improve the situation and could in theory restore pareto efficiency.
These measures all require some entity with authority over all the harvesting agents.
Sometimes this entity exists, usually in the form of a national government. For this
to be the case the fish stock must exclusively inhabit one nation’s economic zone.
If the fish stock is shared by two or more nations we are back to the inefficient
competitive equilibrium. The difference is that the individual fishermen have been
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replaced by different countries all trying to maximize their piece of the cake.
This kind of competitive harvesting is the topic of this thesis. This is relevant
for many of the world’s fisheries. The Pacific salmon fishery, the Baltic cod fishery
and the North-East Arctic cod fishery (which will from here on be referred to as
the NEA cod fishery) are all examples of fisheries that are shared between different
countries. This thesis will focus on the latter of these. The NEA cod fishery is for
the most part shared between two countries: Norway and Russia. Other countries,
most notably Iceland, also harvest the stock, but Norway and Russia are by far the
most important agents. The two countries have signed an agreement determining
how much each country’s fishermen are allowed to harvest each year. For this reason
one might think that the fishery is best described by cooperation between the two
countries. This thesis will, however, for the most part analyze the situation as a
competitive equilibrium.
One reason for this is that agreements to cooperate over common pool resources
are by nature unstable (although less so when few different parties are involved). It
is often possible for one or more of the agents taking part to be better off by uni-
lateraly abandoning the agreement, or to cheat and harvest or pollute more than
they are supposed to. Indeed, Hannesson (2011) finds that Russian enforcement
of quotas and other restrictions are lacking and that this leads to overharvesting
from the Russian side. Another reason is that the competitive equilibrium is the
bargaining chip used by both countries in negotiating the agreement. A favourable
competitive equilibrium means an agent’s threats to abandon the agreement are
much more credible, increasing their bargaining power. Understanding the com-
petitive equilibrium is therefore important, even in a situation where the agents
cooperate.
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the consequences of climate changes for the
north-east Arctic cod fishery. Specifically, I will examine what would happen if
a larger share of the mature stock was available in the Russian zone. Today, the
mature cod spend most of their time out in the open ocean where they inhabit
both the Norwegian and the Russian economic zones. In spawning season, however,
they migrate towards the Norwegian coast. One possible effect of higher ocean
temperatures is that new spawning areas are established further north and east, in
Russian territory, as described by Stenevik and Sundby (2007). This would mean
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that the Russian share of the mature stock increases.
This scenario has also been analyzed in Hannesson (2006). This article finds
that such a change improves the efficiency of the fishery as Nash equilibrium har-
vest rates are lowered and therefore closer to the optimum. Norway is actually
better off as they weren’t harvesting the spawning migration in the baseline case
anyway. Hannesson’s article also finds the counter intuitive result that if Russia
gets a larger share of the total stock this could actually make Norway better off,
as increased Russian conservation incentives and correspondingly reduced Norwe-
gian conservation incentives leave Norway able harvest more freely. These results
highlight the role of incentives and provide motivation for exploring these further.
While Hannesson uses a detailed, calibrated model, this thesis will use a sim-
pler algebraic model. This implies a sacrifice of realism and the ability to predict
magnitudes in order to get results that are easily interpretable. The goal is not to
estimate catch volumes or efficient harvest patterns but rather to examine how the
fundamental incentives work in such a situation. I will therefore use a model which
isolates these incentives and shows how the strategic situation can be affected by
the distribution of the stock. This thesis will discuss the actions and incentives
of the agents in detail, while Hannesson’s article is more focused on the results
themselves.
One assumption that Hannesson makes is that the spawning migrations in the
Russian and Norwegian zones are equally big, and his article does not discuss what
would happen if this was not true, except in the case where ownership of the entire
stock shifts in Russia’s favour. In other words, he does not analyze the consequences
of asymmetric distribution in much detail. The model used in this thesis is more
flexible in that regard and will be used to show the outcome for all distributions
ranging from full Norwegian ownsership to full Russian ownsership of the mature
age class.
The model that I will use is an extended version of the one from Levhari and
Mirman (1980). This framework was selected because it allows feedback solutions
for the dynamic game. Modified versions of the Levhari-Mirman model have been
used in several articles over the last decades. One example is Antoniadou et al.
(2012) which adds uncertainty to the original model. It is then found that under
the specific assumptions of the model, uncertainty doesn’t affect harvesting pat-
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terns. For this reason, the model used in this thesis will not include uncertainty.
Another example of interest for this thesis is Nieminen and Diekert (2014). This
article explores the consequences of anticipated climate change. Recruitment and
agent behaviour is similar to the original model, but climate change will cause the
ownership of the stock to change after an uncertain amount of time. Both play-
ers know this change is coming, but not when. It is found that this regime change
causes additional inefficiency as the agent that will lose ownership has less incentive
to conserve the stock.
Blanchard and Pereau (2015) develop a model that is similar to the one used
in this thesis. It is based on the Levhari and Mirman (1980) model and, like this
thesis, it expands on the original model by having several stocks in stead of just one.
The difference is that in my model the stocks represent different age classes, while
in Blanchard and Pereau (2015) they represent different species. Their methods are
therefore very similar to the ones that will be used in this paper but the application
is different.
Another take on NEA cod fishery is found in Sumaila (1997). This article
analyzes the fishery as a game between a coastal fleet and a trawler fleet rather
than two countries. What separates the two fleets is their selectivity and the age
classes targeted. The coastal fleet harvests only mature cod and this gives it an
advantage in managing the stock. Under cooperation the trawler fleet is therefore
bought out by the coastal fleet. This result can be reversed if the time horizon is
short or if agents are impatient. Under competition the trawler fleet does better.
Sumaila finds the Nash equilibrium for the competitive case and this is then used
to find a bargaining solution for the cooperative game with side payments.
One lesson from Sumaila (1997) that is a common theme in many articles is the
advantages of harvesting mature cod rather than immature cod. Too large harvests
of immature cod leads to inefficiency as fish are not allowed to grow sufficiently
to maximize the generated value from the fishery. This phenomenon is known as
growth overfishing and is discussed in articles such as Quaas et al. (2013), Skonhoft
et al. (2011), Diekert (2012) and Diekert et al. (2010). The latter of these articles
discusses the Arctic cod fishery and finds that a large part of the inefficiency in
the fishery is caused by agents not taking growth potential fully into account and
therefore overharvesting the immature fish. This is a factor that could be impor-
4
tant in the case of changed ownership of the mature age class as the conservation
incentives would be altered.
The effect of climate change on international fishery agreements is discussed in
Miller et al. (2013). The authors give several examples of how fishery agreements can
collapse when the natural conditions are changed and explains how game theory
can help understanding of these challenges. It is stressed that it is necessary to
plan ahead for such events to avoid the losses and, in the worst case scenario,
extinction of fish stocks that breakdown of agreements will lead to. This highlights
the importance of analyses such as what this thesis aims to provide.
The thesis is organized as follows. The main part of this thesis will start with the
introduction of the model at the beginning of chapter 2. The functions, variables
and parameters are shown and explained. The model has two agents: Norway and
Russia. These agents could have other names. They could, for example, be called
USA and Canada if we were talking about the Pacific salmon fishery. The model
is general enough that it could well be applied to other shared fish stock across the
globe. For the purpose of this thesis, however, it is practical to call them Norway
and Russia.
Then, in section 2.1, the cooperative solution is shown as a benchmark. This
represents the ideal distribution and harvest patterns and will contrast with the
competitive equilibrium that is the main focus of this thesis. I will set up the
optimization problem and from there find optimal harvests as shares of the stock
values. The next step is then to derive the steady state stock values and harvests.
This is followed by a discussion of the results. Section 2.2 begins the analysis of the
competitive case. The optimization problems of the individual agents are set up
and conditions for optimal harvest subject to the actions of the other country are
derived. These are then used to find equations characterising the Nash equilibrium.
Chapter 3 then continues the analysis by using these equations to examine the
effects climate change could have on the steady state Nash equilibrium. This is
done by graphical analysis. Effects on steady state stocks and harvest of immature
and mature fish by both countries are shown for two scenarios, one where Russian
valuation of harvest of mature fish increases in isolation (section 3.1) and one where
it increases at the expense of Norwegian valuation of harvest of mature fish (section
3.2). I then discuss the mechanisms that lead to these results. The conclusion then
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provides further thoughts about the model and its results, as well as some discussion
beyond the model.
All of the graphs and some of the more complicated calculations in this thesis
have been generated using Matlab.
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Chapter 2
The model
This model is designed to analyze competition between Norway and Russia over
the NEA cod stock. The stock is modelled as consisting of two age groups: mature
and immature cod. One period’s escapement of immature fish becomes the next
period’s mature fish, while the escapement of mature fish spawns the next period’s
immature fish and then dies. The model setup is similar to the one in Levhari and
Mirman (1980), except that there are two age classes. The dynamics are described
by the following difference equations:
It+1 = (Mt −HMt)α (2.1)
Mt+1 = It −HIt (2.2)
Here I denotes immature fish biomass while M denotes mature fish biomass.
α is a parameter that determines how quickly the stock will regrow towards its
equilibrium. The smaller α is, the faster this regrowth will be. It is assumed that
0 < α < 1, which implies that the recruitment function is concave so that an increase
of the mature stock by a certain factor is going to increase the recruitment by a
lower factor. If left unharvested, each age class will have an equilibrium biomass
of 1. Immature escapement biomass will one for one turn into mature biomass the
next period. This is because it is assumed that growth and mortality cancel each
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other out. This is of course a special case, but it is kept this way for mathematical
simplicity. It is assumed that both age classes are available for harvest in both
the Norwegian and the Russian zone but their distribution may be asymmetric. A
share γ of the immature stock and a share δ of the mature stock is found in the
Russian zone. It is assumed that δ is originally smaller than 1
2
. This is because the
mature fish migrate to the Norwegian cost to spawn and hence are assumed to be
available in greater quantities in the Norwegian zone. Both countries maximize the
following utility function:
U i =
∞∑
t=0
βt(pi lnH iMt + q
i lnH iIt) (2.3)
Utility is assumed to be logarithmic and separable. The latter assumption is
made for mathematical tractability and may not be entirely realistic as one would
expect the countries to care about total profit rather than attaching some intrinsic
value to harvest of both age classes. β is a parameter that determines by how much
future utility is discounted. A lower β implies that agents are more impatient.
i denotes the nation which is either R for Russia or N for Norway. pi and qi
are variables that determines how much utility the country gets from harvest of
mature and immature fish respectively. They represent each country’s profitability
of harvesting the respective stock. It is assumed that greater density of fish leads
to lower harvesting costs. Therefore an increase in the Russian share of the mature
stock (δ) is going to lead to increased pR.
2.1 Cooperative solution
I will start by showing the cooperative case as a benchmark. In this case the
maximization problem is the following:
max
HNMt,H
N
It ,H
R
Mt,H
R
It
U =
∞∑
t=0
βt(pN lnHNMt + q
N lnHNIt + p
R lnHRMt + q
R lnHRIt) (2.4)
The cooperative solution is equal to the first best solution. This means that
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total utility is maximized. For this solution to be stable we must be in one of
two cases. The first is that both are better off cooperating than competing. The
second is that one is worse off, but side payments are possible so that the better off
country compensates the worse off country. If side payments are not possible the
worse off country will have no reason to stay with the cooperative solution, and it
will collapse.
In order to solve this maximization problem I set up the Bellman equation:
V (Mt, It) =
max
HNMt,H
N
It ,H
R
Mt,H
R
It
(
pN lnHNMt + q
N lnHNIt + p
R lnHRMt + q
R lnHRIt + βV (Mt+1, It+1)
)
(2.5)
This equation states that the value of the combined fish stock, which is the
same as all discounted future utility, is equal to the sum of the utility from optimal
harvest this period and the discounted value of the combined fish stock next period.
Guessing that a functional form of V = A lnM +B ln I +C solves the problem and
inserting this into the Bellman equation gives
V (Mt, It) = max
HNMt,H
N
It ,H
R
Mt,H
R
It
pN lnHNM + q
N lnHNI + p
R lnHRM + q
R lnHRI
+ β
(
A ln(I −HNI −HRI ) +B ln(M −HNM −HRM)α + C
)
(2.6)
The functional form used states that value is linear in the logarithm of both
stocks. A and B serve as valuation coefficients for the mature and immature stock
respectively. In order to find the solution of the problem I take the first order
conditions with respect to the different harvests.
∂V
∂HNM
=
pN
HNM
− αβB
M −HNM −HRM
= 0 (2.7)
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∂V
∂HRM
=
pR
HRM
− αβB
M −HNM −HRM
= 0 (2.8)
∂V
∂HNI
=
qN
HNI
− βA
M −HNI −HRI
= 0 (2.9)
∂V
∂HRI
=
qR
HRI
− βA
M −HNI −HRI
= 0 (2.10)
These conditions all say that the marginal utility from each country’s harvest
of each stock should equal the marginal social cost. The latter is the same as
the discounted future utility foregone by removing fish and thus either preventing
maturation or reproductive. Solving this equation system for the different harvests
yields
HNM =
pN
pN + pR + αβB
M (2.11)
HRM =
pR
pN + pR + αβB
M (2.12)
HNI =
qN
qN + qR + βA
I (2.13)
HRI =
qR
qN + qR + βA
I (2.14)
Inserting these results into the Bellman equation gives
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A lnM +B ln I + C = pN ln
pN
pN + pR + αβB
M + qN ln
qN
qN + qR + βA
I
+ pR ln
pR
pN + pR + αβB
M + qR ln
qR
qN + qR + βA
I
+ β
(
A ln
βA
qN + qR + βA
I + αB ln
αβB
pN + pR + αβB
M + C
)
(2.15)
I then sort the terms.
A lnM+B ln I+C = (pN+pR+αβB) lnM+(qN+qR+βA) ln I+pN ln
pN
pN + pR + αβB
+ qN ln
qN
qN + qR + βA
+ pR ln
pR
pN + pR + αβB
+ qR ln
qR
qN + qR + βA
+ βA ln
βA
qN + qR + βA
+ αβB ln
αβB
pN + pR + αβB
+ βC (2.16)
Matching coefficients tells us A = pN+pR+αβB and B = qN+qR+βA. The rest
of the right hand side is C. Notice that A and B are equal to the denominators in
the optimal harvest functions (equations 2.11 through 2.14). This tells us that each
country harvests a share of each stock equal to their valuation of harvest relative
to the total valuation of the stock.
Solving for A and B gives the following values:
A =
pN + pR + αβ(qN + qR)
1− αβ2 (2.17)
B =
qN + qR + β(pN + pR)
1− αβ2 (2.18)
The stock valuation coefficients are linearly increasing in all of the harvest co-
efficients. Insertion into the harvest functions gives
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HNM =
pN(1− αβ2)
pN + pR + αβ(qN + qR)
M (2.19)
HRM =
pR(1− αβ2)
pN + pR + αβ(qN + qR)
M (2.20)
HNI =
qN(1− αβ2)
qN + qR + β(pN + pR)
I (2.21)
HRI =
qR(1− αβ2)
qN + qR + β(pN + pR)
I (2.22)
To find the steady state solution we define M and I as equal to MSS and
ISS (steady state stock levels of mature and immature fish) and insert them into
equations 2.1 and 2.2. This results in the following equation system:
MSS = ISS −HNI (ISS)−HRI (ISS) (2.23)
ISS =
(
MSS −HNM(MSS)−HRM(MSS)
)α
(2.24)
To find the steady state stocks we then insert the equations for optimal harvest
and solve for MSS and ISS.
ISS = (αβ2)
α
1−α (2.25)
12
MSS = β
(pN + pR) + αβ(qN + qR)
qN + qR + β(pN + pR)
(αβ2)
α
1−α (2.26)
Both stocks are increasing in β. This is unsurprising as caring more about the
future will intuitively lead to less fish being harvested, which will lead to higher
recruitment. The effect of α is ambiguous. A higher α leads to lower recruitment
for any given escapement of mature fish, but also to lower harvest as a share of the
stock for both age classes. It does, however seem reasonable to expect the direct
effect to dominate. In order to find the total effect of α on ISS we take the derivative
of equation 2.25 with respect to α. This yields the following:
∂ISS
∂α
=
(
log(αβ2)− alpha+ 1) (αβ2) α1−α
(α− 1)2 (2.27)
(α−1)2 is a square and therefore always positive. So is (αβ2) α1−α . The sign of the
derivative is therefore determined by the sign of the expression log(αβ2)−alpha+1.
this is negative as long as the following equation holds:
α− logα > 1 + 2 log β (2.28)
This is true for any α between 0 and 1 as long as β is between 0 and 1. If this is
the case the right hand side will always be less than 1, while the left hand side will
tend to one from above, but not actually reach 1 before α = 1 (because log 1 = 0).
Therefore, equation 2.28 always holds within the assumptions of the model.
It is interesting to see that the steady state stock of immature fish is independent
of pN , pR, qN and qR. In fact, it is almost identical to the steady state level found
in Levhari and Mirman (1980). In that paper the steady state level of the stock
is equal to (αβ)
α
1−α . The only difference is that here β is replaced by β2. The
reason for this is that in Levhari and Mirman fish will be able to reproduce right
away, while in this model any fish spawned will be unable to reproduce for one more
period. This means their value is discounted for two periods rather than just one.
One implication of these steady state equations is that the escapement of mature
13
Figure 2.1: Harvest in the cooperative case
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fish in all periods has to equal (αβ2)
1
1−α , as this is the escapement that gives the
optimal recruitment. Again, this is independent of utility coefficients. This means
that the total biomass in the ocean and the total biomass harvested is the same
regardless of any of the model’s nation specific variables. The impact of pN , pR, qN
and qR on the steady state solution is to determine how much of the harvested
biomass is mature fish and immature fish, and how it is distributed between the
countries. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1. This figure shows what happens as pR
and pN , in this case assumed to be equal, increase. The horizontal line at the top
of the screen shows the recruitment, or the stock of immature fish, while the lower
horizontal line shows escapement of mature fish. The curve in between shows total
harvest of mature fish. For any p, the distance between the curve and the lower
line is equal to total harvest of mature fish, while the distance between the curve
and the top line is equal to total harvest of immature fish.
To find expressions for steady state harvest I insert the steady state stocks into
the optimal harvest functions.
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HNM =
βpN(1− αβ2)
qN + qR + β(pN + pR)
(αβ2)
α
1−α (2.29)
HRM =
βpR(1− αβ2)
qN + qR + β(pN + pR)
(αβ2)
α
1−α (2.30)
HNI =
qN(1− αβ2)
qN + qR + β(pN + pR)
(αβ2)
α
1−α (2.31)
HRI =
qR(1− αβ2)
qN + qR + β(pN + pR)
(αβ2)
α
1−α (2.32)
This gives a very simple and intuitive harvest pattern. Each harvest is propor-
tional to the country’s valuation of harvest for the age class in question relative
to the sum of all the valuations of harvest. In total a share of (1 − αβ2) of the
recruitment is harvested each period, giving a survival rate of αβ2, exactly what is
needed to spawn (αβ2)
α
1−α new fish. To see this, multiply αβ2 with (αβ2)
α
1−α . This
will give (αβ2)
1
1−α , the required escapement of mature fish.
Notice that each country’s harvest of mature fish contains the factor β while
the harvests of immature fish do not. This is because for each generation a certain
amount will be harvested, and harvesting the generation at its immature stage gives
utility earlier. Therefore harvest of mature fish is discounted, so that impatient
agents will harvest more immature fish.
One result from this model that is not always found is that both age classess
are harvested, even in the cooperative case. It is often the case that some age
classes are left unharvested because it is more profitable to let them grow. An
example of this is found in Skonhoft and Gong (2014), where the age class with
the highest ratio of price to fertility is completely harvested before any other age
class is touched. Hannesson (2006) similarly finds that the harvest in the north-east
Arctic cod fishery is maximized if only mature fish are harvested. The reason why
this is not the case in this model is the separability and concavity of the utility
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function. The fact that harvest of one age class does not affect the marginal utility
of harvesting the other age class ensures that it will, assuming the coefficients are
positive, be optimal to harvest both mature and immature fish.
2.2 Competitive equilibrium
Now that the first best allocation has been established I move on to the competitive
case. The difference is that now each country maximizes its own utility subject to
the other country’s harvest, as opposed to some benevolent social planner maximiz-
ing total utility. Under otherwise the same assumptions as before each country’s
Bellman equation is the following:
V (Mt, It) = max
HiMt,H
i
It
pi lnH iMt + q
i lnH iIt + βV (Mt+1, It+1) (2.33)
Inserting the recruitment functions and using the same guess for functional form
as before this becomes
V (M, I) = max
HiMt,H
i
It
pi lnH iM+q
i lnH iI+β(A
i ln(I−H iI−HjI )+Bi ln(M−H iM−HjM)α+Ci)
(2.34)
Here i denotes either Norway or Russia and j denotes the other country. Taking
the first order conditions yields the following best reply functions:
H iM =
pi(M −HjM)
pi + αβBi
(2.35)
H iI =
qi(I −HjI )
qi + βAi
(2.36)
Inserting the corresponding best reply functions of the other player gives the
following equations describing the Nash equilibrium:
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H iM =
pi
pi + pj B
i
Bj
+ αβBi
M (2.37)
H iI =
qi
qi + qj A
i
Aj
+ βAi
I (2.38)
These equations look relatively similar to the corresponding equations in the
cooperative case. There are however two key differences that will be discussed
below.
Inserting the above equations into the Bellman equation gives the following
expressions for A and B:
Ai =
pi + αβqi
1− αβ2 (2.39)
Bi =
qi + βpi
1− αβ2 (2.40)
This by itself tells us that competition leads to inefficiency. A and B determine
the value that each country attaches to the stock (or at least the logarithm of
it), and it is easy to see that they are lower in the competitive case than in the
cooperative case. Here they only include the country’s own valuation of harvest,
while in the cooperative case both countries’ valuations were included. This implies
that neither country takes into account how their harvests affect the other, leading
to inefficiently high harvests.
Notice that if Ai = Aj and Bi = Bj the harvest equations (2.37 and 2.38) are
of the same form as the corresponding equations in the cooperative case (equations
2.11 through 2.14). The equilibrium would still be inefficient, however, as the As and
Bs are different from the cooperative case. This would be a special case however. In
the case where they are not equal the harvest fractions are further skewed compared
to the first-best case. It has already been established that the harvest shares will
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be too high. This is because part of the costs are not internalized. The second
mechanism has a similar explanation but a slightly different impact. If one country
has a higher valuation of one stock, this will cause it to harvest less of the opposite
stock as its marginal cost of harvest (in terms of future recruitment) has increased.
This will, however cause the other country to harvest more as lower harvest from
one country causes lower marginal costs for the other. This did not happen in the
cooperative case as both countries internalized all costs.
Inserting the As and Bs into the above equations gives the following harvest
shares:
H iI =
qi(pj + αβqj)(1− αβ2)
qjpi + pjqi + αβ(2− αβ2)qjqi + βpjpi I (2.41)
H iM =
pi(qj + βpj)(1− αβ2)
qjpi + pjqi + β(2− αβ2)pjpi + αβqjqiM (2.42)
Using the same method as in the cooperative case I find the following values for
steady state stocks:
MSS =
(
αβ2
η
θ
) α
1−α
β
( 
κ
) 1
1−α
(2.43)
ISS =
(
αβ2
η
θκ
) α
1−α
(2.44)
η, , θ and κ are all auxiliary parameters and are defined as follows:
η = qNqR + β(pNqR + pRqN + βpNpR) (2.45)
 = pNpR + αβ(qNpR + qRpN + αβqNqR) (2.46)
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θ = qRpN + qNpR + β(2− αβ2)pNpR + αβqNqR (2.47)
κ = qRpN + qNpR + αβ(2− αβ2)qNqR + βpNpR (2.48)
Inserting steady state stock levels into the optimal harvest functions yields
H iI = q
i(pj + αβqj)(1− αβ2)
(
αβ2
η
θ
) α
1−α
κ−
1
1−α (2.49)
H iM = p
i(qj + βpj)(1− αβ2) (αβ2η) α1−α ( 
κθ
) 1
1−α
(2.50)
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Chapter 3
Comparative statics
3.1 The effect of pR
I will now turn to comparative statics. Using the steady state harvests and stock
levels derived earlier I will explore what happens to the steady state solution as key
variables change. First, I will examine the case where pR increases while everything
else is kept constant. This is an interesting case because it reveals how one coun-
try’s (Russia’s in this case) harvesting behaviour affects both the efficiency of stock
management and the other country’s situation (Norway in this case). I will later,
in section 3.2, study the case where pN , pR, qN and qR are defined as functions of
the country’s share of the relevant stock.
Due to the difficulties of interpreting mathematical results when the equations
have reached the level of complexity seen above, I will in this section primarily
use graphical analysis. To do this certain assumptions have to be made about the
numerical values of the parameters. Unless stated otherwise, these are the assumed
numerical values used in the graphs of this chapter: α = 0.5, β = 0.9, qR = qN = 0.4
and pN = 0.8. Some of the results will rely on pN exceeding qN . These are discussed
in more detail at the end of the section.
Figure 3.1 illustrates how the steady state stocks of immature and mature fish
evolve as pR increases while all other variables are kept constant. It is clear from the
diagrams that increased Russian valuation of harvest of mature fish is beneficial for
stock levels. Both stocks are rising in pR, particularly for low values. pR = 0 gives
very low stock levels. Another observation that can be made from these graphs is
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Figure 3.1: Steady state stocks as pR increases
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Figure 3.2: Harvest of immature fish
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that the impact of pR is much stronger on the mature stock than on the immature
stock. To explain these findings we look at what happens to steady state harvests.
The first graph of Figure 3.2 plots Russian harvest of immature fish against pR.
This graph captures the most important impact of the Russian valuation of harvest
of mature fish. There are large variations, with harvests at pR = 0 being about
4 times the harvests at high values of pR. When Russian fishermen are unable
to profitably harvest mature fish, their incentives to let immature fish grow are
greatly diminished. The only thing preventing them from harvesting the entire
stock of immature fish is the fact that they need to let some of them grow up in
order for new immature fish to be spawned. As pR increases, so does their incentive
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Figure 3.3: Harvest of mature fish
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to conserve the immature stock and steady state harvest of immature fish decreases
steeply. This is a big part of the explanation for the large variation in the mature
stock. When pR is low, Russian harvest of immature fish is high which leads to
few fish ever reaching maturity. The impact on the stock of immature fish is much
smaller, in part because of the concavity of the recruitment function, which implies
that a decrease in the escapement of mature fish will give a smaller decrease in
recruitment, and in part because of how harvests of mature fish are affected. This
will be discussed further.
The second graph of Figure 3.2 plots Norwegian harvests of immature fish
against pR. The effect is, unsurprisingly, opposite of the effect on the Russian
harvest. When Russia harvests a large number of immature fish this leads Norway,
who still harvests mature fish, to harvest few immature fish in order to conserve
the stock and increase recruitment. For low pR and hence high Russian harvest of
immature fish, Norwegian harvest of the same stock is low, while for sufficiently
high pR Norwegian harvest of immature fish exceeds Russian harvest. This gives a
moderating effect on the steady state stock levels.
The first graph of Figure 3.3 shows the effect on Russian harvest of mature
fish. This curve starts at the origin as there will be no harvest when there is no
profitability. It then rises as pR increases. This is another part of the explanation
for why the effect on the mature stock is so much stronger than the effect on the
immature stock. When pR is low, Russian harvest of immature fish is high while
Russian harvest of mature fish is low. For high values of pR it is the opposite.
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Figure 3.4: Total harvest
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This implies that the escapement of mature fish will vary less than the stock of
mature fish. In cases where the steady state stock of mature fish is large harvests
will be large, while in cases where the steady state stock is small harvests will also
be small. Hence the escapement of mature fish will not be as sensitive to pR as the
stock levels, and therefore neither will the stock of immature fish.
The second graph of figure 3.3 illustrates what happens to Norwegian harvest
of mature fish as pR increases. While the curve is rising for all values of pR, it is
easy to see that the effect is much smaller than on the other harvests, especially
the Russian ones. The explanation for this lies in the Russian behaviour. Russian
harvest of mature fish moves in a pattern that is very similar to the changes in the
stock of mature fish. From the Norwegian point of view there are therefore two
effects that to a large degree cancel each other out. A large stock of mature fish is
accompanied by a large Russian harvest, while a small stock is accompanied by a
small Russian harvest. In sum this implies a relatively weak effect on Norwegian
harvest.
It is interesting to see that Norwegian harvests of both age classes are increasing
in pR. In other words, an isolated increase in Russian profitability of harvesting
mature fish makes Norway strictly better off. This happens because an increase
in pR not only shifts Russian harvest towards mature fish, it also causes Rusia to
harvest less biomass in total. This is illustarted in Figure 3.4. To understand this
result we must go back to equations 2.41 and 2.42, which shows the agents’ harvest
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Figure 3.5: Norwegian harvest of mature fish under alternative assumptions
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Figure 3.6: Steady state biomass levels when pN = 0.2
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of each age class as a share of the stock. It is clear that an increase in pR will
lead to Russia harvesting a lower share of the immature stock and a higher share
of the mature stock. In this model, the mature stock is always smaller than the
immature stock if agents are harvesting. This therefore leads to Russia’s total catch
decreasing. Norway’s total catch, on the other hand, is increasing. This happens
for two reasons. One is that the size of both stocks are increasing. The other is
that Norway shift their harvest towards the larger immature stock.
While Norway is indeed made better off by increasing pR, the result that Nor-
wegian harvest of mature fish is increasing is dependent on the numerical values of
the parameters as illustarted in Figure 3.5. Specifically, pN has to exceed qN . In
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words Norway must value harvest of mature fish higher than harvest of immature
fish. If this is not the case Norway may instead decide to harvest less of the mature
fish as a reaction to the increased Russian harvest of this age group. In Figure 3.3
it is assumed that pN is twice as high as qN . This turns out to be sufficient for the
effect of a larger stock to dominate the effect of a desire for more immature fish.
If on the other hand pN = qN = 0.4, the desire for higher recruitment eventually
causes Norwegian harvest of mature fish to fall as pR increases. In the case that
pN = 0.2, half of qN , this happens earlier.
Another result that is changed when pN = 0.2 is the one illustrated in figure 3.1,
that steady state recruitment, and therefore ISS, is increasing in pR. As illustrated
by figure 3.6, immature biomass is actually falling in pR after a certain point. This
is caused by Norway preferring to harvest immature fish and Russia preferring to
harvest mature fish. This leads to a situation where what either country does not
harvest of their preferred age class will mainly benefit the other country, leaving
both sides with powerful incentives for overharvesting. The steady state stock of
mature fish is rising in pR, however. This is because Russia will be harvesting less
immature fish and more mature fish, leading to a larger mature age class but a
lower mature escapement.
3.2 Effects of the ownership of the age classes
The above analysis describes the case where Russian profitability of harvest in-
creases while everything else is kept constant. In a situation where the stock changes
spawning areas and migration patterns this might not be the most realistic descrip-
tion. I will therefore now analyze the case where the harvest valuation coefficients
are dependent on the share of the stock. The new coefficients are defined as follows:
pR = δp (3.1)
pN = (1− δ)p (3.2)
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Figure 3.7: Steady state stocks. Blue curve is for the case where γ = 0.5, red curve
is for the case where γ = 0.75
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qR = γq (3.3)
qN = (1− γ)q (3.4)
Here δ is the Russian share of the mature stock and γ is the Russian share of
the immature stock. p and q is the valuation a country would have if it owned all of
the stock of mature and immature fish respectively. They are assumed equal to 1.4
and 0.8 respectively. It is assumed that this valuation is split between the countries
with shares equal to the shares of the stock. This very simple functional form was
selected because it has some key properties. It ensures that valuation of harvest is
increasing in the country’s share of the stock and that a share equal to zero gives
zero valuation of harvest, ensuring that there is no harvest of the stock in question.
I will assume that γ = 0.5. The following analysis therefore shows the impact of
the distribution of mature fish assuming that the stock of immature fish is evenly
distributed.
The first graph of Figure 3.7 shows what happens to the steady state stock of
immature fish as δ increases from zero to one. The blue curve represents the case
where the immature age class is evenly shared, γ = 0.5. This curve has a top at
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Figure 3.8: Harvests of immature fish
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δ = 0.5. In other words, under the assumption that the immature stock is split
evenly between the countries it is optimal for the mature stock to be split evenly as
well. If one country has a larger share of the immature stock than the other, it is
socially optimal for that country to have a larger share of the mature stock as well.
This is illustrated by the red curve, which shows the effect of δ when γ = 0.75. The
entire curve shift to the right, indicating that the most efficient outcome is reached
when the mature stock is shared unevenly as well. In this context, optimal means
the division of the mature stock that gives the most efficient harvest levels. This is
still not efficient in the first best sense, but it is the distribution that minimizes the
inefficiency caused by competitive harvesting. The second graph of Figure 3.7 shows
the development of the mature stock as delta increases and it tells a similar story,
supporting the above result. Again, the impact is stronger on the mature stock
than on the immature stock. As before, one important reason is the concavity of
the recruitment function.
The graphs of Figure 3.7 are symmetric. This is a consequence of the assumption
that γ = 0.5. This assumption is also going to lead to symmetry in the other figures
of this section, in the sense that the graphs showing harvest for Norway and Russia
are going to be mirror images of each other. As long as the stock of immature fish
is evenly shared, Norway at, for example, δ = 0.4 is going to behave identically to
Russia at δ = 0.6
Figure 3.8 plots Russian and Norwegian harvests of immature fish against δ.
The graphs show that harvests of immature fish are falling as a country’s share of
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Figure 3.9: Harvests of mature fish
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the mature stock rises. This is because, similarly to what happened to Russia in the
previous section, higher profitability of harvesting mature fish makes the country
desire more fish of this age class, and therefore they harvest fewer immature fish.
The opposite is true for the other country as their reduced profitability of harvesting
mature fish shift their harvests in the direction of immature fish. These effects then
amplify each other. For example, if δ increases, Russia will reduce their harvest of
immature fish, while Norwegian harvests will increase. These are both direct effects
of the change in δ. Then Norway will realize that Russia has reduced their harvest
of immature fish causing them to further increase their own, while Russia realizes
that Norwegian harvests have increased, causing them to further reduce their own
harvests.
Figure 3.9 plots harvests of mature fish against δ. It is interesting to see that
these curves have internal maxima. This means that if a country’s share of the
mature stock is sufficiently high, a reduced share would would lead to increased
harvest of mature fish. This happens because a low share of the mature stock for
the other country leads to low conservation incentives and therefore a large harvest
of immature fish. This then leads to low stock levels, particularly of mature fish.
Norwegian harvest of mature fish relative to the stock is always decreasing in δ,
but as the stock is also increasing up to δ = 0.5 the effect on absolute harvest is
ambiguous.
So, then, how does Norwegian utility depend on δ? As it happens, it is always
increasing. This is not a result with a lot of economic insight, but rather a mathe-
28
matical peculiarity of the modeling setup. Harvests are always between zero and one
and hence the logarithms of harvest are always negative. Therefore an increase in
δ, which makes Norway care less about harvest of mature fish, will always increase
Norwegian utility by reducing the negative impact from the logarithm of harvest.
Hence Norwegian utility is in this case not a very interesting variable. It is however
clear from the above figures that it is not in either country’s interest to have all of
the mature stock. This gives the minimum harvest of immature fish and a harvest
of mature fish that is lower than the maximum.
This is an interesting result. It shows that if one country has exclusive access
to the mature stock while the immature stock is evenly divided they are actually
better off if they allow limited access to the other country. Something similar
does, of course, occur in reality as Norway allows Russia access to the spawning
migration. The findings of this thesis suggests that is a wise thing to do. In this
model, a country with little access to the mature stock will harvest the immature
stock with very little thought for conservation, because they know that much of the
escapement will be harvested when they reach maturity by the other country while
they themselves are left out. This gives a massive incentive for growth overfishing.
One could say they are holding the immature stock hostage, but in this situation
there is no communication or agreements between the different parts. Each country
is merely doing the best they can subject to the actions of the other country. If side
payments were possible the country without access to the mature stock would be
able to extract a significant ransom in exchange for not overharvesting the immature
stock.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion and discussion
The competitive harvest analysis has yielded two particularly interesting results.
The first is the result that if one country shifts its harvest towards mature fish this
leads to increased steady state stocks and the other country being better off. As
was explained in section 3.1, this has the simple explanation that the mature stock
is smaller, so that increasing harvest of mature fish at the expense of harvest of
immature fish leads to fewer fish being caught in total. We learn from the analysis
of the cooperative case (section 2.1) that the total harvest is important in this
model. There, it was found that the total catch was unchanged by the ps and qs. In
the competitive case, however, this is no longer true and the degree of overfishing
(deviation from the first best solution) is dependent on these parameters. As has
been shown, an increase in one country’s valuation of harvest of mature fish leads the
steady state biomass of both age classes to increase, bringing the Nash equilibrium
closer to the first best scenario.
This result relies on the assumption that pN > qN . If this is not the case,
an increase in pR could lead to decreased steady state biomass as Russia will be
harvesting the mature stock heavily while Norway will be harvesting the immature
stock heavily. Therefore neither agent has much incentive to conserve as what
they don’t harvest will benefit the other agent. This leads to steady state biomass
dropping. This situation is illustrated in figure 3.6.
This brings us to the second result, namely that if one age class is shared then the
other should be shared as well. This is closely related to the discussion above. The
reason why it was found that an increase in pR led to increased steady state biomass
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is that it caused both countries to conserve the immature fish. If only one age class is
shared while the other is fully owned by one country, neither age class will be spared
as each country will heavily harvest opposite age classes. Keeping the distribution
of the two stocks similar therefore provides the best possible conservation incentives.
Asymmetric distribution inevitably leads to a situation where the majority of the
costs of overfishing is born by the other country.
It would have been interesting to see what happens if both γ and δ were to
change together. This would represent the case where ownership of the entire stock
was changed rather than just ownership of the mature stock. Unfortunately this
framework is not suited to analyze this situation. If γ and δ is replaced by a common
variable in this model, this variable would not affect optimization. Mathematically,
the proximate reason for this is that inserting equations 3.1 through 3.4 into the
steady state equations with γ = δ results in all the γs and δs canceling out. Addi-
tionally, if γ = δ = 0 or γ = δ = 1, I have divided by zero several places. A more
fundamental explanation is that it is only the values of the valuation coefficients
relative to each other that matter in this model. For example, a decrease of both pN
and qN by the same factor does not affect the optimization of Norway and therefore
not of Russia. Such a change would still leave Norway with the same cost-benefit
analysis over how much to harvest of each stock. Although the gain of harvesting
has decreased, the cost has also decreased by the same factor as the country now
has a lower valuation of the other stock.
A decrease in a country’s p and q represents a decrease in profitability and
therefore lower utility from harvest. However, as long as the coefficient is greater
than 0 harvest will never be unprofitable. There are also no increasing marginal
costs. Therefore, a low share of both stocks would not prevent large harvests.
Utility would certainly be lower but only because less profit is made for each unit
harvested. Harvests would be just as great as before.
Although the model developed in this thesis is unsuited to analyze the situation
it is generally the case that competition leads to inefficiency in fisheries. A sole
owner will take all effects into consideration and it will not overharvest as all costs
would be born by him. With competition this is no longer the case as part of the
costs will be born by someone else. Indeed, in this model a sole owner would achieve
the first best exploitation of the stock. The literature is practically unanimous about
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competition leading to inefficiency. One emprirical example of this is Diekert et al.
(2010), which finds that the inefficiency in the arctic cod fishery is caused by the
strategic situation. It therefore seems to be clear that competitive harvesting is
detrimental to efficiency. This makes the findings from Figure 3.7 all the more
interesting. This model yields the result that if one age class is shared between two
countries then the most efficient outcome is reached if the other age class is shared
as well. In other words, sharing the other age class actually leads to improved
efficiency.
This is a result that highlights some important aspects of competitive harvesting.
While competition is generally bad, the lack of it can under certain circumstances
be equally destructive. This model gives an example of how partial competition can
be the worst scenario of all. This happens because the inability to harvest one of
the age classes leaves the country in question with little incentive for conservation
as any fish they leave in the water will mainly benefit someone else. This leads the
country in question to drastically overharvest the age class they do have access to.
In the extreme case that one of γ and δ is equal to 0 and the other is equal to
1 the situation turns into a sequential fishery similar to that examined in Laukka-
nen (2003) and Laukkanen (2005). One country will have exclusive access to the
immature stock and another will have exclusive access to the mature stock. In this
case what one country doesn’t harvest of its respective stock will only benefit the
other country next period, which means neither country will have much incentive
for conservation. This is of course not a very likely scenario for cod, as it would
require the mature and immature stock to exclusively inhabit different economic
zones with no overlap in their inhabited areas.
It should be mentioned that the severity of the problems caused by assymmetric
distribution of the age classes are probably overstated in this model. One reason
for this is that, as already mentioned, there are no barriers to how much fish can
be harvested. In the numerical example given in figures 3.7 through 3.9 a country
with no access to the mature stock will actually harvest more than their share of
immature fish. This would of course be impossible in a situation where the countries
close their economic zones to each other, and increasing costs of harvest would likely
make it impossible to harvest all the fish in the country’s own zone. The incentives
explored here would still apply, however.
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On the face of it, climate change leading to cod shifting their spawning grounds
from Norwegian to Russian territorial waters sounds like a bad deal for Norway.
This thesis has given some reasons why this may not be the case, or at least not
as bad as it appears on first sight. It has been shown that a distribution where
each agent’s share of both age classes is similar gives the best management of the
stock. Today, the spawning migration takes place in Norwegian territorial waters.
This means that Norway has greater access to the mature stock than Russia. The
findings of this thesis therefore gives reason to expect an overall improvement to the
efficiency of the fishery and hence greater steady state biomass. This will benefit
Norway as well as Russia.
In addition to this effect, Norway may benefit from Russia being incentivized
to harvest more mature fish and less immature fish. In the model explored here,
this happens because harvest is linear in the stock and there is no biomass growth
between the immature and mature stages. These factors in combination imply that
shifting harvest towards mature fish leads to lower total harvest, giving a larger
spawning stock and therefore greater recruitment. This mechanism may not be
entirely realistic as it relies on some rather specific assumptions of the model, but the
result may still be relevant. One important factor that this model does not capture
is growth overfishing, which means fish are harvested inefficiently young while they
still have a lot of growth potential. This problem arises because the growth is going
to benefit everyone, but each agent will only take their own benefit into account,
leading to too many immature fish being harvested. It seems reasonable to expect
that owning a larger share of the mature age class would cause Russia to reduce
growth overfishing as a larger share of the costs would also be born by them. This
could then produce a similar result to the one found here.
If one thinks of stock levels and harvest in this model in terms of numbers of
fish instead of biomass, the link between growth overfishing and the result described
above becomes clearer. With this interpretation, a higher pR leads Russia to harvest
a lower number of fish rather than a lower biomass. This is precisely the point of
catching mature rather than immature fish, as harvesting the mature fish provides
more biomass per fish caught (or in this model, higher utility). This enables a larger
catch (higher utility) while still allowing more fish to reproduce, leading to higher
steady state stock levels.
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This thesis has therefore provided two arguments why Russia getting increased
ownership of the mature age class could make Norway better off. Hannesson (2006)
also reaches a similar conclusion, despite using a very different model. There is
therefore reason to expect that this scenario would not be as bad for Norway as one
might expect.
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